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Introduction
Central bank intervention in foreign exchange
markets most recently came into prominence dur-
ing the period of exchange-rate volatility in the
autumn of 1992. Speculators doubted that Euro-
pean central banks would be able to defend the
exchange rates agreed upon as part of the Euro-
pean Rate Mechanism. After massive intervention,
central banks eventually capitulated, and several
key exchange rates were allowed to fall radically
against the German mark (DM). While this se-
quence of events would seem to have cast con-
siderable doubt on the usefulness of sterilized
intervention, disagreement continues both within
policy circles and among researchers as to
whether sterilized central bank intervention is a
useful tool for exchange-rate management.
1
Until recently, studies of intervention have
been hampered by a lack of official data, as
direct measures of central bank intervention
• 1 Researchers would point out that this most recent period was not
a good test of intervention's efficacy because exchange-rate management
was not the sole objective of the central banks. In addition, some of the
intervention may not have been sterilized, making it difficult to isolate its
impact. "Sterilization" occurs when the effect of intervention on the money
supply is offset by open market operations. Nonsterilized intervention is
thus, in some sense, equivalent to monetary policy.
have usually not been made available to the
public. Now, however, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System provides a time
series of U.S. dollar intervention vis-a-vis the
DM and the Japanese yen from 1985 to 1992.
One consequence of the former lack of imme-
diately available and accurate intervention in-
formation has been the use of daily newspaper
reports as proxies for actual intervention mag-
nitudes in related studies.
The possibility that intervention is not re-
ported accurately may have important implica-
tions for understanding the signaling mechanism
of intervention. For example, such inaccuracy
may call into question the ability of intervention
to signal future monetary policy with precision.
In addition, it may reflect differences in the infor-
mation available to foreign exchange traders, sug-
gesting that some traders may be able to profit
from inside information.
In this paper, we begin with a discussion of
issues regarding information about intervention.
We then describe the data on actual intervention
and newspaper reports. In the third section, we
outline the procedure that we use to test for sys-
tematic differences between reported and actual in-
tervention series. In the final section, we briefly




There is by now a substantial literature de-
voted to understanding the impact of central
bank intervention on foreign exchange mar-
kets. Recent useful summaries of this literature
have been provided by Dominguez and
Frankel (1993), Edison (1993), Humpage
(1991), and Obstfeld (1990).
2
While most recent studies, such as Baillie and
Humpage (1992), Baillie and Osterberg (1993),
and Hung (1992), use official daily intervention
data, others, such as Klein and Rosengren (199D
and Kaminsky and Lewis (1993), use daily news-
paper reports of intervention.
3 If the focus of a
given study is on the signaling role of interven-
tion, then it makes sense to utilize newspaper re-
ports that reflect the information available to the
average trader.
One concern is that the choice of interven-
tion data, reported or actual, may influence re-
searchers' conclusions about the efficacy of
intervention. However, we would like to raise
two other possible concerns, namely, that if
there is a systematic difference between actual
and reported intervention, 1) the signals as rep-
resented by the newspaper reports may be mis-
leading, and 2) some market participants may
have more accurate information about interven-
tion than do others. That the latter is possible
can be seen simply by considering the mecha-
nisms of intervention. U.S. intervention counter-
parties are either brokers or commercial banks.
If brokers are utilized, they will not reveal that
the transaction is official intervention. If com-
mercial banks are utilized, the wire services
should accurately reveal that the Federal Re-
serve has entered the market.
4 In either case,
the only market participants with definitive
knowledge are the counterparties chosen by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
If we are willing to assume that the newspaper
reports indicate what is known about interven-
tion by the uninformed trader, then a systematic
difference between actual and reported interven-
tion implies a systematic difference in knowledge
among market participants. However, it is not
clear how much time passes before all market
participants learn of the intervention, or even if
they ever obtain accurate information short of
the official release one year later by U.S. authori-
ties. In addition, it is unclear if the newspaper re-
ports are written during the course of the day
and are thus affected by changing and uncertain
views about intervention activity, or whether
they represent a presumably more accurate,
end-of-day assessment.
We know of only three previous comparisons
of actual and reported U.S. intervention data.
Klein (1993) uses multinomial logit analysis to
calculate the probability that intervention is re-
ported, conditional on the size of the interven-
tion. He estimates that, without conditioning on
size, the probability that actual intervention is
reported is 72 percent, and the probability that
reported intervention actually occurred is 88
percent. He also shows that newspaper reports
are more likely if the intervention is relatively
large. Dominguez (1992) examines the impacts
of reported and "secret" intervention on the
volatility of the DM/U.S. dollar exchange rate.
She assumes that actual intervention not re-
ported in the newspapers is "secret." No signifi-
cant difference is seen between the impacts of
the two categories of intervention on volatility.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993) tabulate actual
and reported interventions by the United States
and Germany from November 1982 through
October 1989. The accuracy of newspaper re-
ports varied across different time periods. For
example, while all 22 U.S. interventions in the
period September through November 1985
were reported, only 73 percent of interven-
tions from March 1989 through October 1989
appeared in the print media?
We make two contributions to the literature
on central bank intervention. First, we construct
a comprehensive data set from newspaper re-
ports of central bank intervention for the period
January 2, 1985 to October 11, 1991. This data set
improves on those constructed by other research-
ers by quantifying qualitative reports (such as
"small" intervention) rather than disregarding
them. Second, we test for the existence of sys-
tematic components in the differences between
• 2 A consensus of the literature is that if sterilized intervention mat-
ters at all, it does so because it signals a change in information about
monetary policy.
• 3 Still others have 1) constructed monthly numbers intended to
capture the shift in international portfolios due to intervention (for exam-
ple, Ghosh [1992]), 2) attempted to define intervention in terms of the
monetary authorities' balance sheets (see Danker et al. [1987]), or 3)
used measures of central banks' foreign reserves (for example, Glick and
Hutchison [1992] and Watanabe [1992]).
• 4 However, the market sometimes seems to make guesses that con-
fuse intervention operations with correspondent transactions.
• 5 Dominguez (1992) and Dominguez and Frankel (1993) utilize re-
ports of intervention from The London Financial Times, The New York
Times, and The Wall Street Journal. Klein (1993) uses the first two sources.actual and reported intervention, calculating
these differences using either dummy variables
or numerical magnitudes. We also either in-
clude "rumors" in the reported series or dis-
card them. With few exceptions, we find that
there are systematic components; that is, the
differences are serially correlated.
II. Data
Actual
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System provided us with time series of U.S. net
daily dollar transactions from January 1985 to Oc-
tober 1991. All data are in dollars, representing
the actual net dollar purchases (sales) rather than
dollar equivalents that have been translated into
dollars via application of the exchange rate.
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These data are now publicly available, with a
one-year lag, from the Board of Governors. We
report the results of our analyses with three
categories of intervention: U.S. intervention vis-
a-vis unspecified currencies carried out in
terms of U.S. dollars, U.S. intervention vis-a-vis
the DM, and U.S. intervention vis-a-vis the yen.
Using these data, we created dummy vari-
ables, each of which equals +1 for positive net
dollar purchases, -1 for negative net dollar pur-
chases (positive sales), and 0 if the country did
not intervene (its net dollar transaction was 0).
Newspaper Reports
After having searched The Wall Street Journal,
The New York Times, and The Financial Times,
we ultimately decided to record the daily press
reports of intervention from the foreign exchange
column of The Wall Street Journal.
1 We recorded
all mentions of intervention that were indicated
as pertaining to the previous day or previous
business day. Thus, if there was first mention of
intervention a week after its occurrence, we do
not record it, on the presumption that it would
not have been known by the market at the time.
As in the case with the actual data, for each
category of intervention, a buy/sell variable
was created to indicate whether a country was
a net buyer or seller of dollars. It equals +1 if
the country bought dollars, -1 if it sold dollars,
and 0 if it did not intervene. To correspond to
the way in which the actual intervention data
were constructed, we documented U.S. interven-
tion in the DM/dollar and yen/dollar markets. A
buy/sell variable was constructed for each mar-
ket, indicating whether the United States bought
(+1) or sold (-1) dollars. Thus, reported U.S. in-
tervention in each of these two markets is re-
corded in two places. For example, if the United
States was reported to be buying yen, we would
record this under the United States selling dol-
lars vis-a-vis the yen, and also in the (overall)
U.S. selling category described previously (and
denoted as U.S. vs. $U.S. in the tables). For all
groups, we recorded the size of the interven-
tion if given. This includes qualitative terms
such as small, moderate, and large, as well as
dollar magnitudes when given.
After all data were recorded, we calculated
the minimum, median, and maximum of the re-
ported dollar magnitudes for each U.S. inter-
vention variable when such magnitudes were
reported in the newspaper. We substituted for
qualitative terms. For terms indicating "small,"
"light," or "token," we used the minimum for
the particular category of intervention. For
"modest" or "moderate," we substituted the me-
dian. For "large" or "heavy," we substituted the
maximum. If no indication of size was given,
we used the median. For example, if the
United States was reported to be intervening
heavily against the yen, we would substitute
the maximum of all numeric reports of the
United States buying or selling dollars against
the yen. We then created a net transaction vari-
able for each category by multiplying the
buy/sell dummy variable by that amount. This
variable is comparable to the actual net inter-
vention variable. The minimums, maximums,
and medians for all of the reported intervention
variables are provided in table 1.
We also recorded specific mention of rumors.
8
For a given country A, two types of rumors are
recorded: 1) whether country A intervened on its
own behalf, and 2) whether country A inter-
vened on behalf of country B (or whether coun-
try B intervened on behalf of country A). In the
white noise tests that we describe below, we
either disregard the rumors (treat them as being
nonreports) or count them (treat them the same
as other reports). The details of our treatment of
rumors and "on behalf of" transactions are de-
scribed in the appendix.
• 6 Such a procedure would embed simultaneity into any sub-
sequent analysis of the relation between intervention and exchange rates.
• 7 This source is the most consistent of the three. While the use of
only one source may seem to make our series less comprehensive than it
would otherwise be, the amount of information that we obtain from this
news report is greater. In addition, we avoid having to determine how to
code reports when disparities arise among different sources.
• 8 Thus, an erroneous report is not the same as an erroneous rumor.TABLE 1
Minimum, Median, and Maximum
for the Size of Reported Intervention




SOURCE: Authors' calculations based
1985 to December 31, 1991.
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The two test statistics utilized in this article are those calcu-
lated by the SAS/ETS routine SPECTRA. They are the Kappa
(JO statistic suggested by Fisher (1929) and the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) statistics suggested by Bartlett (1966). Fuller
(1976) presents their formulas as follows:
*=1
K— S = maximum absolute difference of Ck , the cumulative




/„ (Z) is the largest periodogram of a sample of m periodogram
ordinates with two degrees of freedom. Here, CO indicates fre-
quency, with m = in - 0/2 and n being the number of
observations.
In both K and K- S, the periodogram is being used to
search for periodicities of uaspecified form.
a Fuller (1976), p.
282, states that "for many nonnormal processes we may treat
the periodogram ordinates as multiples of chi-squared random
variables." He further discusses how this assumption helps to
motivate the formulas given above. However, as we note in the
text, the peculiar nature of the data here requires us to qualify
our application of these test statistics to our data and to con-
sider alternate sample periods and alternate calculations of the
series. Fuller (1976), p. 284, gives the distribution of K, and
Birnbaum (1952) gives the distribution of K- S.
a! The concept of a periodogram is detailed in Fuller 0976), p. 275.
III. White
Noise Tests
The white noise tests focus on the U.S. inter-
vention categories. For each reported intervention
variable, we vary the series along two dimen-
sions: First, we either count all rumors (about
whether there was intervention or rumored "on
behalf of" intervention) or discount all rumors.
9
Second, we use either numerical values or dum-
my variables. The use of dummy variables may
help to ameliorate some problems discussed
below regarding the appropriate use of our statis-
tical technique.
Although we could see if errors in reports
of intervention were of economic significance
by comparing the impacts of actual and re-
ported intervention on exchange rates, that pro-
cedure would require us to specify a model of
the interaction between intervention and ex-
change rates. Given the multiplicity of frame-
works used to study intervention, we elected
to utilize a technique that is not model-specific:
testing for whether the differences between re-
ported and actual intervention are white noise.
A time series is white noise if it has a mean
value equal to zero and if observations are seri-
ally uncorrelated.
The two statistics we report below are those
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Kappa tests,
provided by the SAS/ETS (1990) version 6 rou-
tine SPECTRA. A detailed discussion of these
tests is found in Fuller (1976), pp. 282-S5. The
exact calculations are described in box 1. In
our application of the tests, a finding that a se-
ries is not white noise implies that the series
contains serial correlation rather than that it
lacks a nonzero average.
1
0 However, there are
some limitations as to how one can interpret
these test results.
First, the interpretation of the error equaling
zero is ambiguous because it does so whenever
1) there was no intervention and no intervention
was reported, and 2) there was intervention that
was reported accurately. That this ambiguity is
not a desirable characteristic of our procedure
can be seen by comparing three scenarios. In one
• 9 As an example, consider a report that "the Federal Reserve pur-
chased 100 million yen, rumored to be on behalf of the Bank of Japan."
In a series that counts rumors, this would be entered as a purchase of yen
(sale of dollars) by the Japanese, while in the "no rumors" series, it
would count as a U.S. purchase of yen.
• 10 Utilizing the AOJMEAN option in the SPECTRA routine sets the
average of the series to equal zero.TABLE 2 A
Descriptive Statistics for Actual,




















































































Actual but Reported but








U.S. vs. $U.S.: U.S. intervention vis-a-vis unspecified currencies, carried out
in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. DM: U.S. purchases or sales of DM in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. Yen: U.S. purchases or sales of yen in terms of U.S. dollars.
NOTE: "Buying" and "Selling" columns are in terms of purchases and sales
of millions of U.S. dollars.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
ways. First, we split the sample in half to con-
trol in part for changes in the frequency and
patterns of intervention. Second, we calculate the
errors using both dummy variables and numeric
variables. Using dummy variables will reduce the
number of errors if the newspapers seldom cor-
rectly report the amount of intervention.
Another limitation to our procedure is that
our data may violate the maintained hypothesis
that they are generated by a continuous random
variable. Intervention either takes the value of
zero (the vast majority of days) or jumps to a
number of the magnitude of 100 (100 million
U.S. dollars). Here again, we hope that by using
dummy variables, which exhibit smaller jumps,
we reduce the impact of such discontinuities.
IV. Intervention
Data and Errors
Tables 2A-2C describe the actual intervention
data, the reports of intervention, and rumored
interventions.
1
2 The first line, "U.S. vs. $U.S.," de-
notes U.S. purchases or sales of unspecified cur-
rencies. This includes the number of days that
the United States intervened in all currencies, in-
cluding the DM and yen, as indicated on the
next two lines.
1
3 We use this measure in our as-
sessment of the overall accuracy of reports about
U.S. intervention, since newspaper reports often
do not specify the foreign currency in which the
United States is intervening.
1
4
In table 2A, we see that there were 294 actual
U.S. interventions for the full sample period, 184
reports of intervention, and 38 rumors of inter-
vention. Thus, at most, 76 percent of interven-
tions were mentioned in the newspaper ([184 +
38] /294 = 0.76). At the bottom of the table, we
case, imagine a typical day in the midst of a
long period in which there was no interven-
tion and no reason to expect intervention. In
the second case, imagine that the newspapers cor-
rectly report the cessation of intervention at the
end of a period of turbulent markets and frequent
intervention. In the third case, assume that a non-
zero amount of intervention is correctly reported.
In all three cases, the error is zero, although differ-
ent information is provided in each case.
1
1
We hope to ameliorate the impact of this
factor on our result by varying the data in two
I 11 This problem would be ameliorated if we were able to model
the joint process governing the intervention/exchange-rate interaction.
This process presumably will yield an expected intervention variable and
in turn will specify the significance of errors in reported intervention on
the exchange rate.
• 12 We compiled many more categories of reports than are ana-
lyzed in the tables. Our comparisons were restricted to those series for
which we had actual intervention data.
• 13 Note that the United States sometimes intervened with more
than one currency within one day.
• 14 The official data are in dollars, so in our comparison of re-
ported and actual intervention, we have restricted ourselves to reports ot
dollar intervention. Fortunately, when reports specify amounts, they indi-
cate the dollar magnitudes, eliminating the need to convert via applica-
tion of the exchange rate.TABLE 2 B
Descriptive Statistics for Actual.





















































Actual but Reported but






















U.S. vs. $U.S.: U.S. intervention vis-a-vis unspecified currencies, carried out
in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. DM: U.S. purchases or sales of DM in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. Yen: U.S. purchases or sales of yen in terms of U.S. dollars.
NOTE: "Buying" and "Selling" columns are in terms of purchases and sales
of millions of U.S. dollars.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
report errors, either from comparing actual and
reported or from comparing actual and ru-
mored intervention. On the one hand, there
were 135 days on which intervention occurred
but was not reported, implying that it was re-
ported only 54 percent of the time. On the
other hand, only 25 of the 184 reports were er-
roneous (86 percent accuracy). In the case of
rumors, however, most were in error: For 24
of 38 rumors, there was no actual intervention.
Tables 2B and 2C present similar information
for the two sample halves.
1
5 Almost twice as
much actual intervention in the U.S. vs. $U.S.
category occurred in the second half of the
sample as in the first. In the U.S. vs. DM cate-
gory, intervention was much heavier in the sec-
ond half of the sample, as the United States
shifted to buying DM (selling dollars). Reports
of intervention appear to capture these pat-
terns. However, in the U.S. vs. DM and U.S. vs.
yen categories, occurrences of reports fall far
short of the number of actual interventions.
This finding stands in sharp contrast to the find-
ings in the previous paragraph regarding the
U.S. vs. $U.S. category.
Table 3 presents the results of the white noise
tests, separated by whether the reported series
omits or includes rumors and by whether we use
numeric or dummy variables.
1
6 All of the white
noise tests were performed on both the full sam-
ple and on each half of the sample. Splitting the
sample is an attempt to see if the results are sen-
sitive to choosing sample periods that vary re-
garding either the intensity of intervention or its
pattern. In this case, intervention activity was
heavier during the second subsample.
Generally, with both tests, the full sample and
split samples reject the hypothesis that the time
series of errors are white noise. Thus, there are
systematic components to the differences be-
tween actual and reported intervention. For dum-
my variables, we reject the hypothesis of white
noise in all cases.
V. Summary
Newspaper reports of central bank intervention
are often used as if they are interchangeable with
actual intervention data. Except in rare cases, ac-
tual data have become available only recently for
the United States, with a one-year lag. Here we
describe detailed time series culled from The Wall
Street Journal and compare them to actual inter-
vention data. We quantify qualitative reports of
intervention for all of the series. To the best of
• 15 We have also compiled analogous tables for the subperiods
January 2-December 31,1985; January 1,1986-February 20,1987;
February 21,1987-February 19,1990; and February 20,1990-October
11,1991. These tables are available from the authors and facilitate com-
parison with previous research on the effectiveness of intervention over
various subsamples.
• 16 Rumored intervention includes rumors about both "own" and
"on behalf of" intervention.TABLE 2 C
Descriptive Statistics for Actual,





















































































Actual but Reported but








U.S. vs. $U.S.: U.S. intervention vis-a-vis unspecified currencies, earned out
in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. DM: U.S. purchases or sales of DM in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. Yen: U.S. purchases or sales of yen in terms of U.S. dollars.
NOTE: "Buying" and "Selling" columns are in terms of purchases and sales
of millions of U.S. dollars.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
our knowledge, this is the first such treatment
of qualitative reports.
Whether we examine numeric values or dum-
my variables, count or discount rumors, or split
the sample, we find that there usually are system-
atic components in the differences between the
actual and reported intervention series. While the
economic significance of any such differences is
unclear, we believe that these findings may have
important implications for understanding the sig-
naling mechanism of intervention. If the newspa-
per reports reflect the markets' final assessment
of intervention activity, then reporting errors im-
ply that the market (with the exception of the
intervention counterparties) is misinformed and
that intervention is unlikely to signal monetary
policy accurately.TABLE 3
























































































































































U.S. vs. DM: U.S. purchases or sales of DM in terms of U.S. dollars.
U.S. vs. Yen: U.S. purchases or sales of yen in terms of U.S. dollars.
NOTE: N= number of observations. For K and K-S, see box 1.
a. Significant at the 5 percent level.







We created two sets of variables from the re-
ported intervention data: The first treats all ru-
mors as true, and the second treats all rumors
as false. The first step in the creation of both
data sets was the formulation of the net dollar
transaction variables for each category of inter-
vention. For the U.S. intervention categories,
this variable is equal to the amount variable,
which is always non-negative, multiplied by
the buy/sell dummy variable.
To compare reported and actual interven-
tion data, we must transfer intervention that
was reported as being on behalf of another
country to that particular country. For exam-
ple, if the United States actually purchased yen
on behalf of Japan, the data that we receive
from the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors
will attribute such intervention to Japan rather
than to the United States. To accomplish this
adjustment, we created two variables for each
country, FOR1 and FOR2. FOR1 equals 1 if the
country intervened on behalf of another coun-
try. FOR2 equals the number of countries re-
ported to be intervening on its behalf.
There is also is a third dummy variable,
FORRUMOR, which equals 1 if intervention by
the country was rumored to be on behalf of an-
other country. To create the data set in which
all rumors are considered true (false), we trans-
ferred (did not transfer) all of the intervention
that was rumored to be on behalf of another
country. Additional details regarding these pro-
cedures are available from the authors.References
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